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WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE GREEN NEW DEAL MEETS
THE OLD GREEN LAWS?
J.B Ruhl* & James Salzmant
ABSTRACT

The multi-faceted infrastructuregoals of the Green New Deal will be
impossible to achieve in the desiredtime frames if the existingfederal, state,
and local siting and environmentalprotection statutory regimes are applied.
Business, labor, property rights, environmentalprotection, andsocialjustice
interests will use them to grindthe Green New Deal to a snail'space. Using
the renewable energy transition as the infrastructurecase study, this Essay
is a call to arms for the need to design New Green Laws for the Green New
Deal. PartI briefly summarizes what we are learning about the pace and
magnitude of climate change impacts and the need for rapid and robust
mitigation and adaptation responses. Part II demonstrates the magnitude
and urgency of new renewable energy infrastructureneeded tofulfill Green
New Dealgoals. PartIII points to the intensity of pushback that renewable
energy has faced under existing siting and environmentalprotection laws.
PartIV uses the Texas wind power experience to argue that mobilizing the
Green New Deal energy transition will require resolving significant tradeoffs regarding environmental protection, property rights, process, and
sovereignty. Ultimately, for the Green New Deal to succeed in its renewable
energy (and other) infrastructure agendas, siting and environmental
protection regulatory regimes will need to tolerate more streamlined, topdown, preemptive processes, as well as extensive use of eminent domain
powers, which necessarily will require new ways of satisfying demands for
distributivejustice andpublic participation.
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INTRODUCTION

It is one hour into the final presidential debate, and the moderator poses
this question to the two candidates: What is your vision for America's
infrastructure?The first candidate proclaims an agenda to "make America
secure again." The candidate's plan is to increase oil and gas extraction,
expand the Nation's pipeline systems, grow the Nation's highway network,
and protect floodplain and coastal communities with enormous hardened
levees and seawalls. The second candidate proclaims an agenda to "make
America green at last." The candidate's plan is to wean the Nation off fossil
fuels and nuclear power, turning us to 100% renewable wind and solar
energy, electrify all automobile and light-duty vehicles, line rivers and
coastlines with protective nature-based living infrastructure, and build a new
national high-speed rail system to reduce demand for flying and driving.
These two infrastructure agendas could not be more different in vision,
but they are very much alike in one key respect-each is an environmental
impact assessment and project permitting nightmare. Anyone familiar with
the past few decades of environmental law knows this is an obvious fate for
the "make America secure again" agenda. Every proposed new stretch of
pipeline, highway, seawall, and other form of "brown" infrastructure, as well
as the resource extraction actions needed to supply the raw materials, has met
stiff opposition from environmental protection, social justice, and "not in my
backyard" (NIMBY) interests, who for decades have used federal and state
siting and environmental protection laws to contest permits and litigate over
project siting approvals and environmental compliance.' The same will be
true for the "make America green at last" agenda.

1. See James W. Coleman, Pipelines & Power-Lines: Building the Energy Transport, 80 OHIO
ST. L.J. 263, 279-80 (2019) (describing how the federal and state governments, environmental groups,
and landowners have been the major forces behind opposition to oil pipeline proposals, and how they can
have the same impact on all types of energy projects); Sam Kalen, A Bridge to Nowhere?: Our Energy
Transition and the Natural Gas Pipeline Wars, MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. (forthcoming) (manuscript
at 38), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3450588 (chronicling pipeline litigation and
disputes across country); John C. Ruple & Kayla M. Race, Measuringthe NEPA Litigation Burden: A
Review of 1499 Federal Court Cases, 50 ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 3, 17),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3433437 (showing the public land management and
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The existing project siting and environmental protection regulatory
regimes do not hand out a "green pass" to infrastructure projects that promote
desirable environmental outcomes.2 The ambitious "green at last" agenda
may warm the hearts of those advocating for robust measures to abate and
adapt to climate change, but infrastructure is infrastructure, plain and simple.
It has to be built somewhere, and it has impacts on the environment. Wind
turbines kill birds and bats; solar arrays disrupt habitat; lithium batteries
require raw materials that must be mined; new natural coastal protection
alters habitat; high-speed rail and new electric transmission lines cut through
habitat and near neighborhoods. 3 And all of them change the landscape,
whether on public or private property.
Indeed, environmental protection interest groups, property rights interest
groups, civil justice interest groups, public lands protection advocates,
environmental protection groups, and business and labor interest groups have
already begun challenging renewable energy and transportation
infrastructure projects like those the "green" candidate proposes, and existing
environmental laws are their weapon of choice. If these early local and

&

infrastructure development and approval agencies experiencing the highest levels of litigation under the
National Environmental Policy Act); David B. Spence, Regulation & the New Politics of (Energy) Market
Entry, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 327, 330 (2019) (tracking opposition to fossil fuel infrastructure).
2. See John Copeland Nagle, Green Harms of Green Projects, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
PUB. POL'Y 59, 96 (2013) (acknowledging that renewable energy projects must comply with
environmental laws); Francesco Fuso Nereni et al., Mapping Synergies and Trade-Offs Between Energy
andthe SustainableDevelopment Goals, 3 NATURE ENERGY 10, 13 (2018) (emphasizing the need for new
sustainable management practices to combat climate change that will also require changes to existing
energy processes and structures).
3. See Nagle, supra note 2, at 62, 66, 77 (providing examples of environmental harms
associated with solar and wind energy production); Nereni et al., supra note 2 (discussing the trade-offs,
and degradation to natural systems, that will occur as new energy systems are designed); see also Samuel
L. Brown & Lauren A. Bachtel, A DecarbonizedEconomy: Risks and Opportunities,34 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T 50, 51 (2019) (discussing environmental and social harms from transitioning to massive
electrification using battery technology for power storage); Cameron Holley et al., Governing Energy
Transitions: Unconventional Gas, Renewables and their EnvironmentalNexus, 36 ENVTL. & PLANNING

L.J. 427, 429-30 (2019) (discussing environmental impacts of transitioning to renewable power sources);
see generally Amy Wilson Morris & Jessica Owley, Mitigating the Impacts of the Renewable Energy
Goldrush, 15 MINN. J.L., SC. & TECH 293 (2014) (discussing impacts of solar power projects and their
mitigation under environmental laws); Benjamin K. Sovacol et al., Sustainable Minerals and Metalsfor
a Low-Carbon Future, 367 SCIENCE 30 (2020) (discussing social and economic impacts of extraction of
raw materials needed for solar photovoltaics, batteries, electric vehicle motors, wind turbines, fuel cells,
and other climate adaptation technologies).
4. Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 251 (2011).
5. See Michael B. Gerrard, Legal Pathwaysfor a Massive Increase in Utility-ScaleRenewable
Generation Capacity, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,591, 10,596, 10,612 (2017) (pointing to renewable energy
projects opposed and delayed through challenges under current environmental laws); J.B. Ruhl,
Harmonizing Commercial Wind Power and the EndangeredSpecies Act Through Administrative Reform,

65 VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1772-73 (2012) (examining how numerous groups have used the Endangered
Species Act to attack the construction of renewable resources, especially wind power); Jeffrey Thaler,
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regional renewable energy projects have met such stiff resistance from all
sides, just imagine how the national-scale "green at last" agenda would fare
on a national scale. It is naive to think that environmental protection
advocates who have fought pipelines and electric transmission lines will rest
easy simply because the new agenda is climate-friendly. As we have already
witnessed, single-issue environmental activist groups will demand that the
new climate-friendly infrastructure be bright green. Nor will entrenched
business and labor interests gladly welcome the transition away from their
industries to the new wave of green infrastructure. 6 And property rights
advocates are never happy. Ironically, the playbook they all will use to block
and tackle the "green at last" candidate's agenda was sketched out, page-bypage, by none other than the environmental protection interest groups who
have been fighting "brown" infrastructure for the past five decades.
It should be obvious that the fictional "make America green at last"
agenda is the core of the proposed Green New Deal.8 Its supporters are
proving myopic. As enamored as they are of the federal, state, and local siting
and environmental laws used to combat the "brown" infrastructure
perpetuated in the other candidate's "secure again" agenda-the National

Fiddlingas the World Floods and Burns: How Climate Change Urgently Requires a Paradigm Shift in

the Permittingof Renewable Energy Projects, 42 ENVTL. L. 1101, 1155 (2012) (arguing that existing
environmental laws prevent us from reducing carbon emissions by building renewable energy sources).
6. A number of labor unions, particularly those representing workers in conventional fuel
industries, have officially voiced opposition to agendas like the "green at last" candidate's. Nick Sobczyk,
Union ChiefSays No to Green New Deal, E&E NEWS (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/special
reports/green new deal/stories/1060211973. Similarly, automobile industry labor unions have expressed
resistance to the adoption of electric vehicles. Chester Dawson et al., They Don't Need Us Anymore: Auto
Workers FearElectric Unrest, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2019-09-27/-they-don-t-need-us-anymore-auto-workers-fear-electric-unrest.
7. The primary focus of this Essay is on the legal obstacles that siting and environmental
protection laws pose for renewable energy and other climate change infrastructure projects. Even if these
legal obstacles can be overcome, social opposition can be a significant barrier to siting projects of the
scale involved for climate change mitigation and adaptation. See, e.g., Neil Gunningham et al., Social
License and Environmental Protection:Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY

307, 330, 337-38 (2004) (providing examples of the ways environmental groups gained influence in the
siting and permitting of pulp and paper manufacturing facilities and noting that these techniques slowed
industrial growth.).
8. The Green New Deal is generally identified with the agenda outlined in a resolution
Representative Ocasio-Cortez introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives, and Senator Ed Markey
introduced in the Senate, in February of 2019. H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019). Among many other
initiatives, the Resolution calls for "dramatically expanding and upgrading renewable power sources," id.
§ (2)(C)(i), investing in high-speed rail, id. § (2)(H)(iii), and "upgrading the infrastructure in the United
States . . . by reducing the risks posed by climate impacts," id. § (2)(B)(iii). For broader descriptions of
the Green New Deal infrastructure goals, see Tracy M. Roberts, Greenbacksfor the Green New Deal, 17
PITT. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2019) and Robert Sussman, Designingthe New Green Deal: Where's the
Sweet Spot?, 49 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,428, 10,429 (2019). Commentary on the Green New Deal is extensive
and growing, and a complete survey is outside the scope of this Essay.
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Environmental Policy Act, 9 Endangered Species Act,'o Clean Water Act,"
National Historic Preservation Act,1 2 Clean Air Act, 3 Migratory Bird Treaty
Act,1 4 and the list goes on, including in-state and local equivalents-the
applicability of these laws to slow or halt Green New Deal infrastructure
seems to have been lost on them. In short, even if the Green New Deal can
overcome political opposition, technological feasibility, and funding
constraints, it has one very big obstacle ahead of it-the Old Green Laws.
This is not news. Over the past decade, several environmental law
scholars have pointed to the disconnect between rapid pursuit of climate
change mitigation and adaptation infrastructure on the massive scales needed
and the gauntlet of assessments, plans, permits, and litigation that siting and
environmental laws put in the way." Their solutions usually rely on
amending existing statutes and regulations to "streamline" assessment and
approval processes and shift burdens of proof, while keeping relatively intact
the public participation and judicial review that define modem environmental
law.1 6 That may no longer be enough.
The Green New Deal makes no mention of simplifying and speeding up
assessment and approval processes-that does not seem to be on the table for
discussion. But it does demand that all the infrastructure it calls for be
deployed with robust attention to environmental protection goals 7 and to
distributive justice and democratic public participation goals.' 8 Just as the
siting of "brown" infrastructure presents those concerns, so too can "green"

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370m-12 (2012).
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012).
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2012).
National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 54 U.S.C. §§ 300101-320303 (2012).
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2012).
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2012).
Coleman, supra note 1, at 304-05; Gerrard, supra note 5, at 10,591; Uma Outka,

Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels: Barriersto Renewable Energy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1702-03

(2012); Ruli, supranote 5, at 1798; Irma Russel, StreamliningNEPA to Combat Global Climate Change:
Heresy or Necessity?, 39 ENVTL. L. 1049, 1051, 1058 (2009); Thaler, supra note 5, at 1155.
16. See, e.g., Gerrard, supra note 5, at 10,599 (pointing to a federal program seeking to
streamline wind project review); Ruhl, supra note 5, at 1799 (emphasizing the structural changes that
should take place under the Endangered Species Act to facilitate wind power development); Thaler, supra
note 5, at 1142 (advocating for a four-step solution to the current regulatory framework that addresses
how to change current laws and enact new ones, all while retaining the fundamental underpinnings of
environmental law).
17. See H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. § (1)(D) (2019) (resolving to secure "clean air and water;"
"climate and community resiliency;" "healthy food;" "access to nature;" and "a sustainable
environment").
18. The Resolution calls for "the use of democratic and participatory processes that are inclusive
of and led by frontline and vulnerable communities and workers to plan, implement, and administer the
Green New Deal mobilization at the local level." H.R. Res. 109 § (4)(F). Numerous other provisions
permeate this theme throughout the Resolution. Id. § (4).
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infrastructure.' 9 That is well and good. Who can be opposed to environmental
protection, distributive justice, and public participation? But this begs the
critical question. Can we plan, site, and construct all the Green New Deal
infrastructure in the timeframe needed to effectively abate and adapt to
climate change and ensure the Green New Deal's commitment to
environmental protection, distributive justice, and public participation? Can
all these goals be harmonized and accomplished with synergy, or are there
trade-offs between them requiring that we strike some balance? What would
that balance be?
We do not know the answer to these questions, because we have never
tried anything like the Green New Deal before. Green New Deal advocates
recognize that they are calling for "a new national, social, industrial, and
economic mobilization on a scale not seen since World War II.",20 As a nation
we did mobilize at national scales during World War 11,21 and we have built
national-scale infrastructure systems,22 but we have no experience trying to
mobilize a new national infrastructure agenda of the Green New Deal's scale
through the modem siting and environmental law machinery. Certainly
nothing like the modem siting and environmental law regimes existed during
World War II, and the backbones of our vast national-scale infrastructure
systems-the public road and interstate highway system, the intra-coastal
waterway, levee systems, and much of the oil and gas pipeline networkwere all planned and fully, or at least largely, in place before the rise of
modern environmental law statutes in the 1970s.23 Most of the disputes
19.

See Uma Outka, EnvironmentalJustice Issues in Sustainable Development: Environmental

Justice in the Renewable Energy Transition, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 60, 64-66 (2012)

(describing the environmental justice issues associated with "green" infrastructure); accordShelly Welton
& Joel Eisen, Clean Energy Justice: Charting an Emerging Agenda, 43 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 307, 357
(2019).
20. H.R. Res. 109, Whereas Clause.
21. Thomas D. Morgan, The Industrial Mobilization of World War II: America Goes to War,
ARMY HiST., Spring 1994, at 31, 33.
22.

Andrea Stone, When America Invested in Infrastructure, These Beautiful Landmarks Were

the Result, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/whenamerica-invested-infrastructure-these-beautiful-landmarks-were-result-180953570/.
23. The 3,000-mile intracoastal waterway was completed by 1950. IntracoastalWaterway,
ENCYCLOP2EDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Intracoastal-Waterway
(last
visited Apr 28, 2020); LYNN M. ALPERIN, HISTORY OF THE GULF INTRACOASTAL WATERWAY

1

(1983), https://www.publications.usace.army.mil/Portals/76/Publications/Miscellaneous/NWS_839.pdf. Railway mileage peaked in the United States in 1916 at 254,000 miles. The Golden Age of
American Railroading,UNIV. OF IOWA LIBRARY (June-Aug. 1989), https://www.lib.uiowa.edu/exhibits/
previous/railroad/; ASS'N OF AM. RAILROADS, A SHORT HISTORY OF U.S. FREIGHT RAILROADS (2019),

https://www.aar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/AAR-Short-History-American-Freight-Railroads.pdf.
The majority of the public roads and highways in the United States, which today amount to over 4 million
miles, were first constructed before 1920. Public Road Mileage, Lane-Miles, and VMT 1920-2015, U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF HwY. POLICY INFO.,

https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/
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channeled through environmental law since then have been over maintenance
(e.g., dredging) and incremental expansion (e.g., new highway spurs) of
those systems.24 In contrast, the Green New Deal calls for new or vastly
expanded build-out of multiple national-scale infrastructure systems, all at
the same time. 25 That is an entirely new proposition for environmental law.
To drive the point home, imagine there was no interstate highway system or
intra-coastal waterway, and someone proposed building them out at national
scales in, say, ten years. That would be an unprecedented environmental
assessment and permitting process, not to mention the litigation quagmire
that would ensue. The Green New Deal proposes no less of an infrastructure
undertaking, and consequently no less of a siting and environmental law
compliance challenge.
Two factors compound that challenge for the Green New Deal
infrastructure in ways that prior national-scale infrastructure did not
experience. First, climate change mitigation and adaptation are not optional,
at least not if we wish to avoid unprecedented deterioration of social and
environmental conditions. 26 That was not true of our prior national-scale
infrastructure. Whether or not to build the interstate highway system was not
an existential question in the 1960s, and public transport options were largely

statistics/2015/vmt421c.cfm (last updated Dec. 14, 2016). The Interstate Highway System's 41,000 miles
were largely built from 1956 to the end of the 20th century. The Interstate Highway System, HISTORY
(Jun. 7, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/us-states/interstate-highway-system. About half of the
existing mainline natural gas transmission network and a large portion of the local distribution network
were installed in the 1950s and 1960s. NaturalGas Pipelines, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 5,2019),
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/natural-gas-pipelines.php. According to the American
Society of Civil Engineers' annual report card on national infrastructure, the Nation's 90,000 plus large
dams were built, on average, 56 years ago, and bridges average 43 years in age. AM. SOC'Y OF CIVIL
ENG'R, DAMS: 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD (2017), https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Dams-Final.pdf;
AM. SOC'Y OF CIVIL ENG'R, BRIDGES: 2017
INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD (2017), https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/01/Bridges-Final.pdf. "[Seventy percent] of the grid's transmission lines and power transformers
are over 25 years old," with the majority built in the 1950s and 1960s, with a 50-year life expectancy. AM.
SOC'Y

OF

CIVIL

ENG'R,

ENERGY:

2017

INFRASTRUCTURE

REPORT

CARD

(2017),

&

https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Energy-Final.pdf;
Sarah Gerrity
Allison
Lantero,
Understanding the
Grid, U.S.
DEP'T OF ENERGY
(Nov. 17,
2014),
https://www.energy.gov/articles/infographic-understanding-grid.
24. See generally, e.g. Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. Nat'lMarine Fisheries Serv., 460 F.3d 1125 (9th
Cir. 2006) (challenging a dredging project in Washington under the NEPA); Senville v. Peters, 327
F.Supp.2d 335 (D. Vt. 2004) (challenging a highway project in Vermont under the NEPA).
25. See H.R. Res. 109 § (2) (listing the numerous investments needed across infrastructure
systems).
26.

See IPCC,

SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS:

GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5oC

5

(2018),

https://www.ipcc.ch/srl 5/chapter/spm/ [hereinafter IPCC, GLOBAL WARMING] (providing an overview of
the potential impacts and risks associated with climate change).
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ignored.2 7 By contrast, and to put it into environmental law terminology, the
"no action" alternative for climate change mitigation and adaptation
infrastructure leads to profoundly dire social-ecological conditions. 28
Second, the Green New Deal does not have as much time to get the job done
as did our prior national-scale infrastructure initiatives. Atmospheric carbon
dioxide levels, now at a level not experienced in several million years, keep
rising. 29 Recent scientific studies reveal that some effects of climate change
are coming online faster and harder than previous models suggested.30 Each
year we delay bending greenhouse gas emissions downward requires that we
bend them downward more sharply the next year,3' and each year we
postpone adaptive infrastructure puts vulnerable communities in graver
danger.3 2 There is no time to waste. Indeed, there is less time than we thought
we had.33 The clock is ticking.
To put the challenge bluntly, the Green New Deal must undertake
multiple national-scale infrastructure initiatives of magnitudes never before
processed through existing siting and environmental law standards and
procedures. The Green New Deal must do so in a timeframe more
compressed than any similar infrastructure initiative faced in the past, while
(in its ideal form) adhering to demanding standards of environmental
protection, distributive justice, and public participation. Using renewable
energy infrastructure as the case study, this Essay demonstrates how daunting
that challenge is and argues that we do not have the luxury of waiting to see
whether there are trade-offs and, if there are, deciding then what to do about
them. Nor can the solution any longer be to propose tinkering with existing
siting and environmental laws. That thinking is too small. Rather, decisive
action must be taken, and now, to design New Green Laws for the Green New
Deal. What that looks like is for another day. This Essay is the call to arms.

27. See Richard F. Weingroff, OriginalIntent:Purpose ofthe InterstateSystem 1954-1956, U.S.
FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/originalintent.cfm (last updated
June 27, 2017) (remarking that decisionmakers did not consider several important effects of the interstate
system, including potential impacts on transit).
28. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (requiring agencies to include "the alternative of no action" in
environmental impact statements).
29.

See UN ENV'T PROGRAMME, EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2019: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at v

(2019), https://unepdtu.org/publications/emissions-gap-report-2019-executive-summary/
alarm that GHG levels show no sign of peaking in the coming years).
30. See infra Part I.
31. UN ENV'T PROGRAMME, supra note 29, at v.
32.

(sounding the

CLIMATE CENTRAL, FLOODED FUTURE: GLOBAL VULNERABILITY TO SEA LEVEL RISE WORSE

THAN PREVIOUSLY UNDERSTOOD 3 (2019), https:/climatecentral.org/pdfs/2019CoastalDEMReport.pdf.
33. Naomi Oreskes et al., Scientists Have Been Underestimating the Pace of Climate
Change, SC. AM. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/scientistshave-been-underestimating-the-pace-of-climate-change/.
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Part I briefly summarizes what we are learning about the pace and
magnitude of climate change impacts and the need for rapid responses. Part
II demonstrates the magnitude and urgency of new renewable energy
infrastructure needed to fulfill Green New Deal goals. Part III points to the
intensity of pushback renewable energy has faced under existing
environmental laws. Part IV uses the Texas wind power experience to argue
that mobilizing the Green New Deal energy transition will require resolving
significant trade-offs regarding environmental protection, property rights,
process, and sovereignty. Ultimately, for the Green New Deal to succeed in
its renewable energy (and other) infrastructure agendas, environmental law
will need to adapt. Whether this means more streamlined, top-down,
preemptive processes, including extensive use of eminent domain powers,
remains to be seen. But now is the time to question openly whether the Green
New Deal can be achieved in a timely manner that also satisfies demands for
environmental protection, distributive justice, and public participation.
I. FASTER AND STRONGER

Recent studies demonstrate two alarming trends: climate change is
having effects in some contexts much sooner than anticipated in even recent
scientific models,34 and many of its effects will be more severe than has been
estimated.35 This is not a case in which faster and stronger call for cheers.
Green New Deal advocates point to these trends as all the more reason
to support their mobilization agenda.3 6 They make a strong case, but the
consequence is that the mobilization also must be faster and stronger. But
how much faster, and how much stronger? No one precisely knows. As a

34. See

IPCC, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS:

SPECIAL REPORT ON THE OCEAN AND

CRYOSPHERE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 7 (2019), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/3/2019/
11 /03_SROCC_SPMFINAL.pdf (identifying effects of climate change on oceans, polar areas, and highaltitude glaciers that are taking hold faster than previously predicted); Oreskes et al., supra note 33
(warning that recent studies show escalating effects of climate change); Jonathan Tirone, New Satellite
Photos Show Climate Change is Sweeping Europe, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/features/2019-04-09/new-satellite-photos-show-europe-s-changing-climate
(highlighting the
acceleration of climate change events in Europe).
35. See CLIMATE CENTRAL, supranote 32 (using advanced satellite imagery to correct for prior
land level elevations measured from tree-tops instead of ground-level, meaning inundation will be more
expansive for any given sea-level rise than previously estimated); IPCC, GLOBAL WARMING, supranote
26 (estimating the severity of impacts); IPBES, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS: THE GLOBAL
ASSESSMENT REPORT ON BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 12 (2019), https://ipbes.net/sites/
default/files/2020-02/ipbes global assessment report summary forpolicymakersen.pdf (explaining
that biodiversity loss is happening more extensively and rapidly).
36. Lisa Friedman & Glenn Thrush, Liberal DemocratsFormally Callfor a "Green New Deal,"
Giving Substance to a Rallying Cry, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7,2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/
climate/green-new-deal.html.
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recent New York Times editorial described it, there is no "cliff" we fall off of
at a certain time if greenhouse gas emissions are not curtailed; rather, we are
on a "slope we slide down." 3 7 But the angle of that slope is not the same all
the way-it gets steeper the longer we delay action. To contain climate
change to a 20C warming scenario, recent studies strongly support the
necessity of reducing greenhouse gas emissions at least 50% by 2030, and to
move to net zero, if not net negative, by 2050.38 Taking these as policy goals
with fixed dates of achievement, every year we delay significant reduction of
emissions means compressing the aggregate emissions reductions into a
shorter time frame. In short, "every year of postponed peaking means that
deeper and faster cuts will be required."3 9
Yet, there is no evidence that global greenhouse gas emission levels have
peaked and turned the comer.40 In November 2019, the International Energy
Agency (IEA) estimated that world energy demand will continue to rise by
1.3% per year until 2040, and that the rise in greenhouse gas emissions, even
with shifts already underway to renewable energy sources, will not peak
before 2040.4' Report after report issued in 2019 confirmed that there is little
to suggest that emission reduction goals set through various international and
domestic institutions are on track to be achieved. 4 2 Even the most climateprogressive states in the United States are falling behind. 43 This is mostly,
but not all, due to politics. The inertia of infrastructure and time needed for

37. Gernot Wagner & Constantine Samaras, Opinion, Do We Really Have Only 12 Years to
Avoid Climate Disaster?,N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/opinion/
climate-change-1 2-years.html.
38.

An Equitable Path to Net-Zero Emissions, NATURE, Dec. 5, 2019, at 7; Negative Emissions:

The Chronic Complexity of Carbon Capture, ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 2019, at 22.
39. UN ENV'T PROGRAMME, supranote 29, at v.
40. Id.
41.

INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

(2019),

https:/iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/1f6bf453-3317-4799-ae7b-9cc6429c81d8/English-WEO-2019ES.pdf.
42. UN ENV'T PROGRAMME, supra note 29, at v (noting that global greenhouse gas emissions
rose on average 1.5 % annually over the past decade and "[tihere is no sign of GHG emissions peaking in
the next few years"); ROBERT WATSON ET AL., FEU-US, THE TRUTH BEHIND THE CLIMATE PLEDGES, at

i (2019), https://feu-us.org/behind-the-climate-pledges/ ("An analysis of current commitments to reduce
emissions between 2020 and 2030 shows that almost 75 percent of the climate pledges are partially or
totally insufficient to contribute to reducing GHG emissions by 50 percent by 2030, and some of these
pledges are unlikely to be achieved.").
43.

CITIZENS BUDGET COMM'N, GETTING GREENER: COST EFFECTIVE OPTIONS FOR ACHIEVING

NEW YORK STATE'S GREENHOUSE GAS GOALS 1-2 (2019), https:/cbcny.org/sites/default/files/media/
files/REPORTGettingGreener 120602019.pdf (identifying obstacles to achieving emission reduction
goals); NEXT 10, CALIFORNIA GREEN INNOVATION INDEX 4 (2019), https://www.nextlO.org/sites/default/
files/2019-10/2019-california-green-innovation-index-final.pdf ("California will reach its 2030 and 2050
goals in 2061 and 2157, respectively representing a 31-year and a 107-year delay.").
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turnover also plays a role.44 For example, the average car on the road in the
United States today is 12 years old, meaning cars sold in 2020 will continue
to require gasoline until 2032, on average. 45 And there is little prospect that
the new car fleet will become all-electric anytime soon-although electric
car sales are rising, they still make up only less than 2% of the U.S.
market46 -meaning new combustion engine vehicles will continue to be put
on the roads for many years to come. Similarly, given the enormous gap
between domestic energy usage and current renewable power capacity
(discussed below),47 we will rely on fossil fuels to meet much, if not most, of
our energy needs for decades to come. Indeed, the CO 2 emissions committed
from existing fossil fuel power plants and those currently planned, permitted,
and under construction (which are mostly in China and India) will alone
consume the entire CO 2 budget that remains to limit warming to 1.50C.4 8 A
significant decline in overall energy demand also is not likely. The U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects low but continued growth
in U.S. end-use sector energy demand through 2050, even taking into account
offsets from expected efficiency gains. 49 Turning the comer on emissions
thus will require aggressive decommissioning of expiring fossil fuel
infrastructure (which in itself presents environmental impact assessment
issues) simultaneously with aggressive introduction of the new renewable
(and clean) energy infrastructure.
To compound matters even more, it is not even clear that the goals
demanded in recent studies and promised in a multitude of government
instruments are actually enough to stall the effects of climate change. A
constant background concern is that the climate system dynamically operates
with multiple interrelated "tipping points" that, once crossed, cascade the
effect and make it more resistant to reversal through emissions reductions.5 0
An example is that loss of arctic sea ice amplifies regional warming, which

44. See JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., US 2050 TECHNICAL REPORT: PATHWAYS TO DEEP

DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, at xv (2014), https://usddpp.org/downloads/2014-technicalreport.pdf (highlighting that we must account for infrastructure turnover in our greenhouse gas reduction
goals).
45. Wagner & Samaras, supra note 37.
46.

EDISON ELECTRIC INST., ELECTRIC VEHICLE SALES: FACTS AND FIGURES (Apr. 2019),

https://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/electrictransportation/Documents/FINALEVSales
2019.pdf.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 61-62.
48.

Update April

0

Dan Tong et al., Committed EmissionsfromExisting Energy InfrastructureJeopardize 1.5 C

Climate Target, 572 NATURE 373, 373 (2019).
49.

U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2019, at 90(2019), https://www.

eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/aeo2019.pdf.
50. Timothy M. Lenton et al., Climate Tipping Points-Too Risky to Bet Against, 575 NATURE
592, 592 (2019).
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leads to more loss of sea ice, and so on." In November 2019, a team of
scientists warned that these tipping points may be approaching sooner than
was previously thought and have more widespread impacts than
anticipated.5 2 This means the emission reduction goals currently used as the
benchmarks, and which are in dire jeopardy of not being achieved, possibly
understate how fast the reductions need to occur.
To have any real chance of success, therefore, the Green New Deal
mobilization must be swift and relentless. It has to start today. As the next
Part shows, Green New Deal advocates are well aware of the urgency and
have charted such an agenda. It is not as clear, however, that the Green New
Deal designers fully appreciate the scale of transition they have proposed.
II. How MUCH Do WE NEED?
As the Pathways to Deep Decarbonization project outlines,53 a threepronged strategy must be adopted for an energy transition scenario to succeed
in reducing greenhouse gas emissions at levels and in time frames needed to
contain climate change to a 20C scenario:
Deep decarbonization requires three fundamental changes in the
U.S. energy system: (1) highly efficient end use of energy in
buildings, transportation, and industry; (2) decarbonization of
electricity and other fuels; and (3) fuel switching of end uses to
electricity and other low-carbon supplies. All of these changes are
needed, across all sectors of the economy, to meet the target of an
80% GHG reduction below 1990 levels by 2050.54

To achieve these, the core Green New Deal goal is to reduce human
sources of greenhouse gases globally by "40 to 60 percent from 2010 levels
by 2030" and achieve "net-zero global emissions by 2050.",5 Among the
ambitious measures the Green New Deal advocates for doing so is "meeting
100 percent of the power demand in the United States through clean,
51. Id.
52. Id. at 595.
53.

See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 44, at xv.

54. Id. (emphasis omitted). See also THE WHITE HOUSE, MID-CENTURY STRATEGY FOR DEEP
DECARBONIZATION 7 (2015), https://unfccc.int/files/focus/long-termstrategies/application/pdf/mid
century strategy report-final red.pdf (emphasis omitted) (aiming to "transition[] to a low-carbon energy
system, by cutting energy waste, decarbonizing the electricity system and deploying clean electricity and
low carbon fuels in the transportation, buildings, and industrial sectors"). There is growing concern that
even these initiatives, if achieved, will not suffice, and that carbon dioxide removal technologies must be
developed to facilitate net negative emissions. Negative Emissions, supra note 38.
55. H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong., Whereas Clause (2019).
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renewable, and zero-emission energy sources."56 The Green New Deal sets
an aspirational ten-year timeframe for this and other goals of its "Green New
Deal mobilization."5 7 Whether nuclear power is in that energy mix is not
specifically addressed in the Resolution. A "Launch" fact sheet document
that briefly appeared on Representative Ocasio-Cortez's website the day she
introduced the Resolution anticipates building no new nuclear plants and
decommissioning all existing plants as soon as possible, ideally within ten
years.58 Although that document is not part of the Resolution, it may suggest
what advocates of the Green New Deal will work towards in energy policy,
if they get the opportunity to steer that policy space. 59 For illustration
purposes, therefore, assume as a starting point that nuclear power is phased
out of our nation's energy mix, as in "no new nukes." 60
On that assumption, what is the gap that renewable energy sources must
fill in for an "all renewables" policy? Answering this question involves
projecting two scenarios-how much demand for energy will there be that
must be satisfied from renewable energy, and how much new renewable
energy generating capacity will be needed to meet that demand? Many
factors, particularly the pace of technological change and global economic
performance, are in play in answering those questions, producing a relatively
wide range of possibilities. Some representative scenarios illustrate the
magnitude of renewable energy infrastructure needed to fulfill the Green
New Deal mobilization.
On the demand side, according to the EIA, the four energy end-user
sectors-transportation, industrial, residential, and commercial-consumed
75.9 quadrillion BTUs (quads) of energy from all sources in 2018, a record

56. Id. § (2)(C).
57. Id. § (2).
58. Green New Deal: Fact Sheet, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5729035/GreenNew-Deal-FAQ.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2020); see also Lisa Friedman, What Is the Green New Deal? A
Climate Proposal, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019) (explaining that Representative OcasioCortez's office initially distributed the fact sheet, but later retracted it).
59. A coalition of over 250 organizations advocating for adoption of the Green New Deal
recently urged Congress to "reject expensive false solutions that extend our reliance on dirty energy,
including biomass, nuclear, and carbon capture and storage." 250+ Groups Call on House Select
Committee on the Climate Crisis to Heed Green New Deal, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH (Nov. 22, 2019),

https:/foe.org/news/250-groups-call-house-select-committee-climate-crisis-heed-green-new-deal/
(linking to the letter and listing all the groups calling on the Committee for action).
60. To a large extent, whether new nuclear power infrastructure is in or out of the Green New
Deal does not change the basic thesis of this Essay-new nuclear power facilities would face stiff
opposition and be mired in lengthy permitting and litigation ordeals under existing environmental laws.
See Brad Plumer, Why America AbandonedNuclearPower (and What We Can Learn From South Korea),

Vox (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/2/29/11132930/nuclear-power-costs-us-france-korea
(noting that, after the Calvert Cliffs decision, citizen suits under the NEPA increased against nuclear
plants).
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high (this does not include the 38.3 quads of primary energy the electric
power sector consumed to produce the electricity the other sectors consumed,
which would be largely unnecessary in an all-renewable power scenario). 6 1
Of that amount, 11.5 quads-11% of the total-were supplied from
renewable energy sources (geothermal, solar, wind, biomass, and
hydroelectric).62
Boosting the share of demand supplied by renewable sources involves
three related infrastructure initiatives. First, we have to build the renewable
generating capacity to serve the 64.4 quads of end-use demand currently
served by other sources.63 Second, to the extent the new renewable generating
facilities are not located near the existing electricity transmission grid, new
transmission lines will need to be constructed. 64 Third-and just as
important-we have to shift end uses currently consuming fossil fuel energy
sources to using electricity as their energy source. This is not an
insurmountable challenge for residential and commercial sectors, which
consume primarily electricity and natural gas, as residential and commercial
buildings can relatively easily switch from natural gas to electricity for much
of their heating and cooking needs.65 By contrast, the transportation sector
depends on petroleum for over 90% of its energy, and the industrial sector
depends on fossil fuels for over 75 %.66 Moving those two sectors, which
combined consume two and a half times more energy than the residential and
commercial sectors combined, into electricity will be a daunting challenge. 67
In short, it is not enough that we build out wind and solar generating
facilities-we must build more transmission infrastructure to move the clean
electricity and reconfigure the end-user infrastructure to use it.
Even assuming substantial progress is made on transmission and enduser infrastructures, to go "all renewable" will require a transition of the 64.4
quads currently supplied from other sources (petroleum, natural gas, coal,
and nuclear) to renewable sources of electricity.68 This is a monumental

61. See U.S. Energy Facts Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 28, 2019),
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/us-energy-facts/ (showing that, in 2018, the transportation sector
used 28.3 quads, the industrial sector used 26.3 quads, the residential sector used 11.9 quads, and the
commercial sector used 9.4 quads, for a total of 75.9 quads).
62. Id.
63. Id
64. See infra Part IV (discussing the Texas CREZ project, and how the transmission challenge
for electric vehicles extends all the way to the charging unit infrastructure).
65. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 61.
66. Id.
67. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 44, at xv ("[T]ransformation would be required in other
sectors . . . . The average fleet fuel economy of [light duty vehicles] would need to exceed 100 miles per
gallon .... This would require the deployment of roughly 300 million alternative fuel vehicles by 2050.").
68. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 61.
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undertaking. To translate into more functional terms, a terawatt hour is the
electrical energy consumption rate equal to a trillion watts consumed in one
hour, and a quad equals 293 terawatt hours. 69 The "all renewable" scenario
thus requires installing new renewable power generating capacity capable of
supporting consumption demand of 18,874 terawatt hours.70 Simply as a
reference point, Texas, the leading state in wind power generation by far, is
projected to have the capacity to supply 87 terawatt hours from wind in
2020.'
As a practical matter, however, virtually every assessment supports the
conclusion that "[p]olicy makers should treat with caution any visions of a
rapid, reliable, and low-cost transition to entire energy systems that relies
almost exclusively on wind, solar, and hydroelectric power." 7 2 It is more
realistic to chart a "high renewables" agenda that includes some nuclear and
substantial "clean" fossil fuel sources, such as natural gas, for decades to
come. 73 Relaxing the "no new nukes" constraint would help take the pressure
off of renewable sources. Electricity generated from nuclear power facilities
supplied 8% of end-use energy consumption in 2018 74 and could go
substantially higher with new facilities, albeit not without overcoming the
ferocious opposition any proposal for a new nuclear facility will undoubtedly
confront.7 ' For fossil fuels, it is not credible that we can fully transition out
of them swiftly. 7 6 Even if we tried, the reality is that, under foreseeable
technology innovation, not every use of energy in the United States can
convert to electric power, particularly in the transportation sector (e.g., jets)
and manufacturing sector (e.g., cement and steel). For these and other
69. See, e.g., Convert Quads to Terawatt Hours, KYLE'S CONVERTER, http://www.kylesconverter.
com/energy,-work,-and-heat/quads-to-terawatt-hours (providing an online converter) (last visited
Apr. 28, 2019).
70. See id. (converting 64.4 quads into 18,874 terawatt hours).
71. Press Release, Rystad Energy, Red States Go Green: Texas Wind Power on Track to Outpace
Coal by 2020 (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.rystadenergy.com/newsevents/news/press-releases/redstates-go-green-texas-wind-power-on-track-to-outpace-coal-by-2020/.
72. Christopher T.M. Clack et al., Evaluationof a Proposalfor Reliable Low-Cost Grid Power
with 100% Wind, Water, and Solar, 114 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SC. 6722, 6722 (2017).
73. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 44, at xiii. The Deep Decarbonization Pathways project
outlines four distinct scenarios employing substantially different decarbonization strategies, but all of
which met the targets: High Renewable, High Nuclear, High CCS, and Mixed Cases. These primarily
differ in the principal form of primary energy used in electricity generation, and in other aspects of energy
supply and demand. That all met the target demonstrates that redundant technology pathways to deep
decarbonization exist.
74. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 61.
75. See Plumer, supra note 60 (discussing the slow permitting process surrounding nuclear
development and negativity from some environmental groups).
76. Clack et al., supra note 72, at 6723.
77. Antonio Garcia-Olivares et al., Transportationin a 100% Renewable Energy System, 158
ENERGY CONVERSION & MGMT. 266, 270 (2018). Transportation is perhaps the most difficult sector to
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pragmatic reasons, the Democratic-led House of Representatives Committee
on Energy and Commerce in 2020 issued its vision for legislation that would
set "clean energy" as the goal to reducing emissions, which would
accommodate nuclear power as well as natural gas and coal sources if they
meet prescribed emission efficiency standards.
Still, even assuming the Green New Deal goal is scaled back to a high
renewables agenda, we can safely assume for planning purposes that new
renewable energy infrastructure capable of satisfying 10,000 to 15,000
terawatt hours (roughly 30 to 50 quads) of energy demand will need to come
on line by mid-century at the latest in order to get substantial traction on the
Green New Deal's greenhouse gas emission reduction goals. 79 That is
between three and five times the amount of renewable energy being
consumed today.so
How much new renewable power generating capacity will be required
to meet that aspired consumption demand? This is not a straightforward
analysis either, as it depends on many factors. A key determinant is the
capacity factor, the actual energy output from a generating plant over a period
of time, usually framed as a year, as a fraction or percentage of the plant's
capacity.' For coal and natural gas plants, the capacity factor generally
reflects how much the plant is used and not shut down for maintenance or
malfunction.8 2 For wind turbines, the capacity factor is mostly a matter of
how much and how fast the wind blows, since the turbine output varies with
wind speed.83 The capacity factor for wind power in the United States is
usually 30% to 40%.84 Solar power capacity likewise depends on its energy
move close to an all-renewable power scenario and can only get close by assuming substantial changes in
transportation technology and behavior. Id. at 267, 277.
78. H. COMM. ENERGY & COMMERCE, 116TH CONG., THE CLEAN FUTURE ACT 4-5 (Jan. 8,
2020), https:/energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/
CLEAN%20Future%20Act%20Memo%2001.08.20.pdf.
79. See H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong., Whereas Clause (2019) (outlining the Green New Deal's
emission reduction dates).
80. See supra text accompanying note 62. Public and private energy conservation and demand
reduction initiatives can also help take pressure off of the amount of energy source transition needed, and
there is good reason to believe that private corporate incentives could drive substantial energy
conservation. MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS: THE PRIVATE
GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 222-24 (2017).

81. Mike Mueller, What Is Generation Capacity?, U.S. DEP'T ENERGY (Jan. 29, 2018),
https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/what-generation-capacity.
82. Id.
83.

Cf Wind Turbine Heights and Capacities Have Increased Over the Past Decade, U.S.

ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=33912
(explaining that turbine capacity increased alongside turbine height because wind speeds generally
increase at higher altitudes, and also noting that blade length impacts turbine capacity).
84. Mueller, supra note 81. By contrast, nuclear energy has a capacity factor of around 92%,
56
4 8
natural gas around
%, and coal around
%. Id.
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source, the sun, which obviously is not shining all the time, and has a capacity
factor of 20% to 30%. " Estimating the demand a facility can supply,
therefore, requires factoring in this capacity factor fraction. For example, if
a wind turbine capable of generating one megawatt of power has a capacity
factor of 25%, its annual output is 2,190 megawatt hours (1 MW x 365 days
x 24 hours x 0.25 = 2,190 MWh).
The other key factor on the supply side is transmission efficiency. The
energy generated at a power facility has to travel to the consumer, and, along
the way, some energy is lost due to resistance in the lines.8 6 The EIA
estimates that about 5% of the electricity that is transmitted and distributed
is lost annually.1 7
A number of technological and other advancements could help reduce
demand and improve capacity and transmission efficiencies. Energy
conservation behavior could improve, as could the efficiency of end-use
products from household appliances to electric vehicles." There are energyloss efficiencies that will be realized by converting to renewable electric
energy as opposed to fossil fuel sources, especially in transportation.89
Energy losses in the production and transmission of electricity could be
further reduced through technological advancements, such as converting
transmission to direct current lines and by improving the energy capture and
storage efficiencies of wind turbines, solar receptors, and storage batteries. 90
Nevertheless, these behavioral and technological possibilities do not move
the needle on demand or supply until they are developed and scaled up in
production and use. 9' They should be pursued, but counting on them to "save

85. Id
86.

FrequentlyAsked Questions: How Much ElectricityIs Lost in Electricity Transmission and

Distribution in the UnitedStates?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?
id=105&t=3 (last updated Dec. 31, 2019).
87. Id.
88. See Tom King & Alex Laskey, America: The Worldwide Leader in Wasting Energy, FORBES
(Feb. 22, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2013/02/22/america-the-worldwide-leader-inwasting-energy/#70b32d6dl985 (pointing out that the United States ranks first in the world in energy
waste and describing that chronically low energy productivity costs American businesses and households
billions per year).
See All-Electric Vehicles, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY

&

89.

RENEWABLE ENERGY, https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/evtech.shtml (last visited Apr. 28, 2020)
(highlighting that electric vehicles convert significantly more energy from the grid into power than
traditional gas-powered vehicles).
90. Roger Faulkner, AC vs. DC Powerlinesand the ElectricalGrid, ENERGY CENTRAL (Apr. 2,
2013), https://www.energycentral.com/c/ec/ac-vs-dc-powerlines-and-electrical-grid.
91. See Alex Rau et al., Can Technology Really Save Us From Climate Change?, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan.-Feb. 2010, https://hbr.org/2010/01/can-technology-really-save-us-from-climate-change
(exploring different approaches to address the lag between energy innovations and general adoption
by the public).
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the day," and thus waiting on the new technology before fully engaging a
robust renewable energy agenda, would be a folly.
With that background, using a high renewables reference case
incorporating plausible positive assumptions about conservation practices
and technological innovation over time, the Pathways to Deep
Decarbonization estimate of new generating capacity needed to meet
projected demand is daunting:
[M]eeting the 2050 target requires almost fully decarbonizing
electricity supply and switching a large share of end uses from
direct combustion of fossil fuels to electricity (e.g., electric
vehicles), or fuels produced from electricity (e.g., hydrogen from
electrolysis). In our four decarbonization cases, the use of
electricity and fuels produced from electricity increases from
around 20% at present to more than 50% by 2050.

As a result, electricity generation would need to approximately
double (an increase of 60-110% across scenarios) by 2050 while
its carbon intensity is reduced to 3-10% of its current level.
Concretely, this would require the deployment of roughly 2,500
gigawatts (GW) of wind and solar generation (30 times present
capacity) in a high renewables scenario . . .92
Similarly, the Obama Administration's Mid-Century Strategy for Deep
Decarbonization adopted a benchmark scenario using a high renewables
approach accommodating some nuclear and fossil fuel sources and
incorporating positive assumptions regarding efficiency gains and
technological innovations. 93 Under its scenario:
Solar and wind energy account for the majority of capacity
additions, with deployments of roughly 30 GW per year between
2016 and 2035 and over 50 GW per year between 2035 and 2050.
This will require an increase in annual gigawatts of capacity
additions of about 6 percent per year from 2020-2050 from the
current expected pace of roughly 20 GW per year between 2016
and 2020.94

These two estimates frame a range of between 1,350 and 2,500 gigawatts
of new wind and solar renewable power generating capacity that must come

92. WILLIAMS ET AL., supranote 44, at vii (emphasis added).
93. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 54, at 47.
94. Id. at 48.
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online between today and 2050-roughly 15 to 30 times the present
generating capacity. 95 As Michael Gerrard recently concluded from his
similar demand and capacity scenarios assessment, even a high renewables
agenda falling short of the Green New Deal's goals for renewable energy
transition thus calls "for the construction of a massive number of new central
station renewable energy facilities, mostly wind and solar-many times
higher than the amount of such construction ever previously achieved." 96
This immediately raises two additional concerns beyond the challenge
of financing and constructing solar, wind, and other commercial-scale
renewable energy production facilities to fulfill the need. The first is the land
mass required to house commercial scale energy facilities-the so-called
"power density" factor. 97 To produce the same amount of electricity, solar
and wind power generation need around 40 to 50 times more space than coal
powered facilities and 90 to 100 times more space than natural gas powered
facilities.98 The second concern is transmission, given that prime areas for
wind and solar generation do not necessarily (or even usually) correspond
with existing transmission line and end-user geographies. 99 The Texas CREZ
wind power project (discussed below),' 00 for example, involved construction
of 3,600 miles of new high-voltage transmission lines to move wind power
produced in the rural Panhandle area to urban Texas markets.'o' The net
effect is that renewable energy infrastructure, while reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, can increase land-use impacts on habitat, urban neighborhoods,
rural communities, and Native American cultural sites.1 02
Again, technological advances can help soften the land use blow. Land
mass needs could be reduced by shifting to offshore wind production, albeit

95. See id. (calling for an additional 30 GW per year between 2016 and 2035, totaling 600 GW,
and then an additional 50 GW per year between 2035 and 2050, totaling 750 GW, for an estimated total
of 1,350 additional GW); WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 44, at vii (calling for an additional 2,500 GW,
representing 30 times the current capacity).
96. Gerrard, supra note 5, at 10,592.
97. See Uma Outka, The Energy-Land Use Nexus, 27 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 245, 250-52
(2012) (discussing the massive amount of land needed for renewable energy production); John van Zalk
& Paul Behrens, The SpatialExtentofRenewable and Non-Renewable Power Generation:A Review and

Meta-Analysis ofPower Densities and Their Application in the U.S., 123 ENERGY POLICY 83, 83 (2018)
(explaining that renewable energy typically has lower power density than other sources because of the
physical space required).
98. van Zalk & Behrens, supra note 97, at 91 (2018).
99. Welton & Eisen, supra note 19, at 361; NAT'L COUNCIL ON ENERGY POLICY, ELECTRICITY
TRANSMISSION: A PRIMER 14 (2004), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/Documentsand
Media/primer.pdf.
100. See infra notes 133-47 and accompanying text.
101.

WARREN LASHER, THE COMPETITIVE RENEWABLE ENERGY ZONES PROCESS 8 (2014),

https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/08/fl 8/c lasher qer santafepresentation.pdf.
102. Welton & Eisen, supra note 19, at 360-62.
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that has presented its own set of siting and environmental compliance
controversies.' 03 Although considerably more expensive, transmission lines
can be located underground to reduce aesthetic impacts, although trenching
causes habitat disturbance and surface utility easements are still required.1 04
The need for new commercial facilities and transmission lines can be reduced
through distributed energy sources such as rooftop solar units.' 5 For
example, although it is an aggressive scenario, maximizing use of suitable
rooftop spaces throughout the United States for solar power has been
estimated as able to generate electricity equal to 39% of total current national
electric sales-about 1,432 terawatt hours (4.9 quads).1 06 That is but a dent
in the total needed, but every little bit counts.
Still, as all new land uses present siting approval challenges, the prospect
of siting the new commercial-scale renewable power generation and
transmission infrastructure that lies ahead, even with generous assumptions
about conservation, efficiency gains, and technology advancements, is an
unprecedented undertaking. Yet, it is by no means an impossible
undertaking. Impressively, renewable energy generation "provided a new
record of 742 million megawatt hours . . . of electricity in 2018, nearly
double the 382 million .. . produced in 2008," with the vast majority of the
increases coming from solar and wind power. 0 7 But the pace must pick up
considerably, and as noted it is equally as important to convert much of the
energy consumption infrastructure, such as vehicles, to electric.
In short, if time is as much of the essence as the climate science and
policy goals suggest,1os we must begin building the renewable energy
infrastructure and the new wave of vehicles and other end-use units with
current technology, integrating new technology as it develops. This will be,
to say the least, the most ambitious infrastructure project in our nation's
history. To succeed, it must start now, go nationwide, and progress rapidly.

103. See infra notes 111-13, 126-27 and accompanying text discussing the Cape Wind project.
104. The Basics of UndergroundPower TransmissionLines, ELEC. ENG'G PORTAL, https://electricalengineering-portal.com/download-center/books-and-guides/power-substations/underground-power-transmissionlines (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
105. See Jacques Leslie, Utilities Grapple with Rooftop Solar and the New Energy Landscape,
YALE ENV'T 360 (Aug. 31, 2017), https:/e360.yale.edu/features/utilities-grapple-with-rooftop-solar-andthe-new-energy-landscape (describing how distributed energy resources divert customers away from the
grid and "defer infrastructure expansion by producing decentralized, renewable energy or by improving
energy efficiency").
106. PIETER GAGNON ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., ROOFTOP SOLAR VOLTAIC
TECHNICAL POTENTIAL IN THE UNITED STATES: A DETAILED ASSESSMENT 34 (2016), https://www.nrel.

gov/docs/fyl6osti/65298.pdf.
107. U.S. Renewable Electricity Generation Has Doubled Since 2008, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38752.
108. See supra Part I.
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Based on past experience with opposition to deploying renewable energy
infrastructure-good luck with that.
III. THE RESISTANCE
Most people do not like the idea of an oil pipeline or electric
transmission line running through their backyard.1 09 Guess what-they do
not like the idea of wind turbines or solar panels in their backyard, either." 1 0
For all its "greenness," renewable energy of all varieties has faced stiff
opposition in many instances from a broad span of interests attacking on
many fronts.
Local NIMBY opposition has been a prominent battleground."'
Commercial-scale solar and wind power projects, which take up large areas
and are highly visible, have enjoyed no "halo effect" at the local level.11 2 The
poster child for this is the Cape Wind offshore wind power project, which
over the course of 16 years faced a gauntlet of challenges from affluent Cape
Cod communities, Tribal groups, and other interests." 3 Solar facilities face
similar objections. For example, San Bernardino County in California
recently placed stiff restrictions on commercial-scale solar and other energy
projects in desert areas of the county, citing protection of scenic views as a
major reason, along with habitat protection.114
Another source of opposition is conflicts between renewable energy
projects and existing commercial uses of the siting area needed. For example,
109. See, e.g., Mose Buchele, Hill Country Landowners Get Ready for Another Pipeline Fight,
KUT (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.kut.org/post/hill-country-landowners-get-ready-another-pipeline-fight
(recounting Texas City residents' opposition to a crude oil pipeline).
110. See, e.g., Robert Bryce, San Bernardino County Says No to Big Renewables, NAT'L REV.
(Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/03/renewable-energy-land-use-san-bernardinocounty/ ("All across the country rural landowners and governments have been rejecting or restricting
renewable projects.. . .").
111. Indeed, the assaults on renewable energy are so pervasive they prompted the creation of a
law school pro-bono clinic to offer free legal assistance to renewable energy projects facing NIMBY
opposition. Renewable Energy Legal Defense Initiative, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L.,
https:/climate.law.columbia.edu/content/renewable-energy-legal-defense-initiative (last visited Apr. 28,

2020).
112. David R. Baker & Millicent Dent, NIMBYs Shoot Down Green Projects Next Door While
the Planet Burns, BLOOMBERG (Sept 17, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-0917/nimbys-shoot-down-green-projects-next-door-while-planet-burns.
113. Gerrard, supra note 5, at 10,600. For thorough timelines of the Cape Wind saga, see Cape
Wind, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/renewableenergy/studies/cape-wind, and Timeline of the Cape Wind Project, CAPE COD TIMES (Dec. 2, 2017),
https://www.capecodtimes.com/news/20171202/timeline-of-cape-wind-project.
114. Sandra Emerson, It's Lights Out on Big Solar in San Bernardino County Desert, SAN
BERNARDINO SUN (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.sbsun.com/2019/02/28/san-bernardino-county-board-toprohibit-renewable-energy-development-in-key-desert-areas/.
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offshore wind turbine projects have met resistance from commercial fishing
interests, such as the scallop fishing and squid trawling groups that have
opposed the prospect of offshore wind projects from Long Island to
Massachusetts."' Broader and less visible business interest conflicts also
pose barriers. The Trump Administration's support for the coal industry, for
example, coincides with a slowing down of renewable energy project
approvals on federal public lands.116
Environmental protection interests have also impeded the adoption of
renewable energy by imposing demanding conditions on projects. In one
case, for example, local opponents to a wind power project-that was
projected to kill 26 protected bats over the course of 5 years of operation, and
which agreed to mitigation measures that would have fully offset the impact
of those losses for the species and would have actually improved the
species's chances of recovery-argued that the project should nonetheless
sacrifice substantial energy-generating capacity to reduce the number of bat
mortalities." 7 As Professor David Spence has shown, this kind of local
environmental group opposition (perhaps working in concert with NIMBY
interests), has split the environmental protection interest group community
in general, with national entities generally supporting commercial-scale
renewable energy while their local chapters and other local groups often
oppose it."

Indeed, as Spence meticulously details, the sum total of opposition to
renewable energy infrastructure, coming as it has from NIMBY, business,
labor, environmental, and other interests, has led to the proliferation of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) opposing solar facilities, wind facilities,
and transmission lines carrying renewable energy in number and scale that
rivals the NGOs opposing fossil fuel energy infrastructure projects. "9 These
anti-renewable NGOs cite economic, environmental, and health concerns as
reasons for opposition about as much as do the anti-fossil fuel NGOs, but cite
justice concerns much less.1 20 The anti-renewable NGOs also use legal
intervention and political mobilization as opposition tactics at rates similar
115. Christopher Martin & Jennifer A. Diouhy, New York's PrizedSea Scallop Faces OffAgainst
Offshore Wind, BLOOMBERG (May 23, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0523/new-york-s-prized-sea-scallop-faces-off-against-offshore-wind;
Benjamin Storrow & David
laconangelo, Wind Turbines and Fishing Nets Fightfor Offshore Space, E&E NEWS (Sept. 6, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061111175.
116.

Bobby Magill, Renewables on Federal Land Hit Regulatory Snarl, Advocates Warn,

BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2019), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/
renewables-on-federal-land-hit-regulatory-snarl-advocates-warn.
117. Union Neighbors United, Inc. v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 564, 568, 572, 578, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
118. Spence, supranote 1, at 382-83.
119. Id. at384-85.
120. Id.
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to their use by anti-fossil fuel NGOs, but use protest and economic boycott
less. 121
When anti-renewable NGOs use legal intervention as an opposition
tactic, federal and state licensing and siting approval laws, and the ancillary
environmental assessment and compliance laws that are triggered by them,
are as formidable in the anti-renewable arsenal as they are in the anti-fossil
fuel war room.1 2 2 As Professor Michael Gerrard has documented, the
National Environmental Policy Act and federal species protection laws, such
as the Endangered Species Act, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and Marine
Mammal Protection Act, have been invoked in many anti-renewable
litigation challenges, and additional federal statutes used in efforts to block
or delay renewable energy projects include the Coastal Zone Management
Act, Clean Water Act, Federal Land Management and Planning Act, and
National Forest Management Act.1 23
To be sure, environmental protection is a worthy policy goal-we have
dedicated our careers to this pursuit. But using this array of laws to block
renewable energy, ostensibly in the interests of environmental protection,
undermines the energy transition needed to abate climate change and protect
the very resources that are at stake for the long term. This irony seems lost
on the antagonists.
And even if the anti-renewable agenda does not block all projects
directly, it threatens to delay many, and delay can effectively block projects
indirectly. As Michael Gerrard sums up:
Approval delays are costly in several ways. Construction costs
may escalate. New technologies or requirements may compel a
revision in designs, leading to further delays. Applicants may
become so discouraged by the delays that they give up, or their
financing may vanish, or local opposition to siting may grow.
Lenders who require speedy returns may be deterred from
engaging at all. During the years that a renewable facility is not yet
operating, the energy needs it will fill may be provided by fossil
fuel facilities that add to the cumulative load of greenhouse
124
gases.
Of course, this is not to say that every renewable energy project proposal
should be rushed to construction without regard to environmental impacts.
But it is clear that environmental law has been used as a pawn by some
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id. at 339-43.
Gerrard, supra note 5, at 10,595, 10,598, 10,603, 10,609-10.
Id. at 10,591.
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interests to impede renewable energy or make sure it is located "somewhere
else," and as a weapon by other interests whose environmental heart may be
pure but whose environmental eyes may be blind to the goal of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions quickly. 25 1In short, has the anti-renewable
agenda's use of environmental law to demand the perfect become the enemy
of the good?
IV. THE TRADE-OFFS

Demanding environmental and aesthetic perfection has not gone well for
renewable energy. As mentioned above, the Cape Wind offshore wind energy
project faced a staggering cast of well-funded opponents who used an array
of federal, state, and local siting and environmental compliance laws to grind
the project into oblivion after a fight lasting over 16 years and costing the
developers $100 million.1 26 The project developers relinquished their
offshore lease rights in 2018.127 Elsewhere, the largest planned land-based
wind farm in U.S. history, the 2,500 to 3,000 megawatt Chokecherry and
Sierra Madre Wind Project located on federal land in Wyoming, in 2019,
moved a significant step closer to final necessary federal environmental
approval.1 28 The project was proposed in 2008 and required many other
federal, state, and local siting and environmental approvals along the way.1 29
It will be completed, assuming no further delays due to litigation, in 202618 years after being proposed. 3 0 At 2,500 megawatts of generating capacity,
the project could deliver about 0.1 to 0.2% of the 1,350 to 2,500 gigawatts of
new renewable energy generating capacity needed under a high renewables
scenario.' 3 ' That leaves at least 99.8% to go, in 30 years at the most, if we
are to meet the Green New Deal's goals. 3 2 If the Cape Wind and
Chokecherry outcomes guide our future, this seems implausible.
By contrast, a more promising story is offered by the Texas Competitive
Renewable Energy Zones (CREZ) project.' 33 Beginning with state
125. Baker& Dent, supra note 112.
126. Katharine Q. Seelye, After 16 Years, Hopes for Cape Cod Wind Farm Float Away, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/us/offshore-cape-wind-farm.html.
127. Cape Wind, supra note 113.
128. Matthew Bandyk, Largest Planned Wind Farm in US Gets Key FederalApproval, UTIL.
DIVE (Oct. 25,2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/largest-planned-wind-farm-in-us-gets-key-federalapproval/565795/.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
132. See H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong., Whereas Clause (2019) (aiming to reach carbon neutrality
by the year 2050).
133. See LASHER, supra note 101, at 10 (documenting the successes of CREZ).
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authorizing legislation in 2005 and ending with project completion in January
2014, in under ten years CREZ resulted in 3,600 miles of new high-voltage
power lines being built to connect the wind-generating Texas Panhandle area
to the state's major metropolitan areas. 3 4 The CREZ lines have a
transmission capacity of 18.5 gigawatts.13 5 At the time of project completion,
the state reached an onshore wind generation output of 8,863 megawatts,1 36
and in 2020 the state is projected to have the capacity to supply 87 terawatt
hours from wind power sources alone.1 37
What explains the difference in outcomes? One factor stands out above
all else: the Texas electricity grid, known as ERCOT, is separate from the
national grid and thus not subject to rate regulation by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC).1 38 The Texas CREZ lines also crossed no
federal lands, for which federal land management agency approval would
have been required, and did not trigger any federal line siting authority.1 39
Freedom from FERC oversight and federal siting approvals meant freedom
from satisfying the NEPA environmental impact assessment process and the
ESA agency consultation process, and Texas has no state equivalent to the
NEPA or the ESA.1 4 0 In other words, Texas was in charge of siting,
construction, and transmission. Within the state, this meant the legislature
was able to put the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) in charge.141
Acting pursuant to the CREZ legislation, the PUCT process for approval of
the transmission line locations was streamlined.1 4 2 It also heavily relied on
eminent domain, which led to considerable controversy. 143 The PUCT leaves
it largely to wind power developers and landowners to determine where

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id at 3, 8.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Rystad Energy, supra note 71.
R. Ryan Staine, Note, CREZ II, Coming Soon to a Windy Texas Plain Near You?:

Encouraging the Texas Renewable Energy Industry Through Transmission Investment, 93 TEX. L. REV.

&

521, 533 (2014).
139. Id. Electric transmission line siting is subject to federal authority only in limited
circumstances; siting is left primarily to the states. See generally Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse ofElectric
Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 30 ENVTL. L. 1015 (2009) (providing an overview of state
electric transmission siting laws and proposals for greater federal authority); Debbie Swanstrom
Meredith M. Jolivert, DOE TransmissionsCorridorDesignations & FERC Backstop Siting Authority:
Has the Energy Policy Act of 2005 Succeeded in Stimulating the Development of New Transmission

Facilities?,30 ENERGY L.J. 415 (2009) (examining the effect of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 on the
siting of transmission projects).
140. Staine, supranote 138, at 533.
141. Id. at 529.
142. Id. at 530-31.
143. Edward Klump, Texas Fight Could Ripple Across US Grid, E&E NEWS (July 10, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060718759.
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turbines are located.1 4 4 The PUCT also decided that the $7 billion cost of the
project's infrastructure would be borne by all the ratepayers in the state,
rather than only those benefitting from the CREZ lines, thus strengthening
the case for bond financing.1 45 To be sure, other factors, such as abundant
wind and a deregulated energy market, facilitated the CREZ success,1 4 6 but
its speed of deployment was largely attributable to dedicated authorizing
legislation and freedom from the multitude of environmental laws used to
block other renewable energy projects.1 4 7
The contrast between the Cape Wind and Texas CREZ experiences does
not determine which way is the right way to mobilize the Green New Deal
energy transition, but it does suggest the trade-offs that will be necessary to
resolve as we design the way forward. The Green New Deal must
acknowledge that these trade-offs exist and integrate solutions at the front
end of the mobilization. Waiting for them to become salient and deciding
what to do about them then is simply poor governance.
The first is the trade-off between short-term and long-term
environmental protection goals. Laws like the NEPA and the ESA empower
environmental protection interests to demand renewable energy projects
meet stringent short-term goals-the "kill zero bats" standard-when doing
so may jeopardize the long-term goal of saving all the bats, so to speak.1 48
Environmental laws can also serve as cover for other anti-renewable
interests. 149 The core motivation behind the Green New Deal has to be to put
renewable energy infrastructure on the ground (and in the water) as fast as
possible so as to stem the massive environmental destruction that will fall on
ecosystems globally if we do not. It may not be practicable to spare every
bat's demise along the way.
The second trade-off involves property rights. The renewable energy
infrastructure needed to fulfill the Green New Deal will take up space-a lot
of space." 0 This necessarily will require use of eminent domain on private
lands and interference with existing uses, such as cattle grazing and scallop
fishing.'' The use of eminent domain has been a lightning rod for fossil fuel
144. Staine, supranote 138, at 527, 530 n.69.
145. Id. at 533-34.
146. Id. at 525-26.
147. Id at 533; see also Ophir Stemmer, Why Is Texas the LeadingState for Wind Power?, GEO.
WASH. J. ENERGY & ENV'T L. ONLINE (Mar. 20, 2011), https:/gwjeel.com/2011/03/20/why-is-texas-theleading-state-for-wind-power/(providing an overview of these features of the CREZ).
148. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
149. Bryce, supra note 110; Baker & Dent, supra note 112.
150. See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
151. James W. Coleman & Alexandra B. Klass, Energy andEminentDomain, 104 MINN. L. REV.
659, 724 (2019) (suggesting that states could prioritize eminent domain for renewable energy
infrastructure).
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pipeline and transmission line projects.' 5 2 Is there any reason to believe it
will not be the same for commercial-scale wind power, solar power, and new
"clean" transmission lines? Yet, without its robust application, the Green
New Deal renewable energy infrastructure initiative will face significant
barriers.' 53 The affected property interests must be recognized through just
compensation where due, but the prospect ofjust compensation has not kept
property rights interests from opposing renewable energy projects through
every means available, including lobbying for reform of eminent domain
powers.1 54

That leads to the third trade-off: the balance between speed of process
and public participation. There is little doubt that the process used for Texas
CREZ line siting approval does not match up well with the Green New Deal's
vision of a highly democratized and participatory process. 15 But can the
Green New Deal's process vision avoid replicating the Cape Wind story
many times over? Thirty years may now seem like a long time. The problem,
however, is that it is not a matter of turning on all the switches for the first
time in 2050-they need to be turning on every year between now and then,
and we need a lot more switches than we have turned on so far.
The final trade-off involves sovereignty, as in who gets to decide the
first three trade-offs. The Cape Wind project required approvals not only by
federal authorities for placement of the turbines, but also by state and local
authorities for the turbines, as well as for the onshore infrastructure needed
to support the offshore infrastructure.1 5 6 Indeed, conflicts ensued between
state and local authorities, leading to preemptive action by the state. 1 By
contrast, only one entity, the PUCT, ran the Texas CREZ show. 5 Mobilizing
the Green New Deal energy transition will require infrastructure crossing
federal, state, and local lands and jurisdictions. Countless authorities will be
involved. Or, through its preemption powers, the federal government could
put just one entity in charge of the whole show.
These four tradeoffs define two extremes. One extreme, which is
roughly business as usual, will require renewable energy projects to comply
152. Id at 661-62.
153. Id. at 663.
154. See id. at 702-03 (noting that environmentalists have even gone after wind power projects
because their transmission lines affect property value and aesthetics); Jeffrey Tomich, Battle Reignites
Over $2.5B Midwest Transmission Line, E&E NEWS (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/
1061847775 (reporting that landowners groups are working to block a wind project through legislation
preventing the use of eminent domain).
155. See supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
156. See Timeline of the Cape Wind Project, supra note 113 (chronicling the push and pull over
state and federal permitting).
157. Id.
158. See supra notes 138-40.
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with dozens of federal, state, and local siting and environmental laws,
exposing each project to protracted public participation and litigation
challenges over siting, environmental, and property rights compliance, and
requiring final approvals by a multitude of federal, state, and local
authorities. 5 9 If we go down this path, achieving the renewable energy goals
required to meaningfully put a dent in climate change by 2050 is highly
improbable. It would take decades, at a minimum, to plan, site, approve,
litigate, and begin construction on all the needed infrastructure. We do not
have decades.1 6 0
The other extreme would be to replace all that with one omnibus federal
statute authorizing one federal agency to mandate a streamlined renewable
energy infrastructure approval process that preempts state and local
authority, while incorporating siting, environmental, and property rights
goals. If we go down that path, achieving the highly democratized and
participatory goals of the Green New Deal seems highly improbable.161 Of
course, there are countless alternatives in between these two extremes. The
question is, can any get both of the jobs done, and if so, which one is it?
CONCLUSION

We are at a crossroads. We have roughly 30 years to deploy a massive
new renewable energy infrastructure and to electrify the vehicle fleet, not to
mention repair much of our existing infrastructure and put protective
adaptation infrastructure in place. The Old Green Laws, if left intact and
applied to their fullest, will throw up significant obstacles at every step of the
way, and will likely derail much of the Green New Deal agenda and cause us
to miss the targets. The consequences of that will be dire. To avoid them, it
may not be sufficient to tweak every federal, state, and local law involved in
the process so that renewable energy and other necessary mitigation and
adaptation infrastructure is facilitated. The political battles involved in
designing and approving the multitude of tweaks required would alone take
years to play out. In short, the Green New Deal needs New Green Laws, or
perhaps a New Green Law, that somehow balances the infrastructure
deployment goals and timelines with the ideals of environmental protection,
distributive justice, and public participation. To be sure, that is a political
moonshot, but so is the Green New Deal. If the politics ever align to open the
door to the Green New Deal, or at least to a high renewables version of it, the
159. See supranotes 9-14 and accompanying text (outlining the various federal environmental
laws that present challenges to renewable energy projects).
160. See supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 17-18.
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politics at that moment should also consider building the New Green Laws.
The hope of this Essay is that Green New Deal advocates will recognize this
reality and begin work on designing the new regime. We plan to do so.

